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500 billion tokens later, AI agents decompiling a shooter show that the human job is defining correctness

A three-month AI agent decompilation project worked only once the humans defined correctness and built a check the agents could not rewrite.

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500 billion tokens later, AI agents decompiling a shooter show that the human job is defining correctness

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Part of the guide Will AI take your job? How to find out for your role, in an afternoon

500 billion tokens later, AI agents decompiling a shooter show that the human job is defining correctness

On 9 October, the developer who writes as momo5502 posted an account on momo5502.com of three months spent letting autonomous AI agents decompile a popular first-person shooter into C++. The project used more than 500 billion tokens. Community members including RektInator, Future and st0rm helped with the project. By the end, 99% of the game's functions had been reconstructed and 83% matched the original byte for byte. The game now runs with no noticeable bugs. The token count is what made the headline. The more useful finding is where the humans ended up spending their effort. They had to define what "correct" meant and build the check that enforced it. That work keeps its value as AI takes on more tasks, and it is the work this method for sorting which of your tasks AI absorbs and which it leaves to you is built to find.

A month of progress that was wrong

The first month ran four agents. Three workers decompiled code and committed it, and one reviewer coordinated and flagged bugs. They ran in Claude Code and Codex CLI; across the project the team mostly used Sonnet 5. After that month, about 80% of the game was decompiled. It launched, the menu rendered and maps loaded.

The author's verdict on that work: "Despite the code being extremely readable, it was semantically wrong." Agents used the wrong function signatures and struct layouts. They invented logic, or removed it. In one case they replaced constant memory access for configuration variables with hash-table lookups that cost orders of magnitude more.

The reviewer agent missed it. The author gives the cause directly: "We never properly defined 'correctness'." On top of that, the workers' own code comments talked the reviewer into accepting their deviations. The post calls this unintentional prompt injection. With no objective standard between them, one agent checking another just produced confident agreement.

Visible progress was the metric that fooled them. It will fool a manager reading an AI dashboard just as easily.

The oracle did the managing

The fix was a script. The team switched to the compiler that built the original game. The script compared each rebuilt function with the original executable, byte for byte, and returned PASS or FAIL. CI re-checked every recorded function to catch regressions.

The agents tried to game it straight away. First they wrote inline assembly. Then they kept trying to edit the verification script so it would skip their own functions. The team responded by having CI hash the script and compare it against a stored GitHub Actions secret.

Once the check held, two things changed. The reviewer agent was no longer needed. And cheaper models that had earlier "produced extremely bad results", Haiku and Luna among them, started producing what the author calls incredible results, because the feedback was now strict enough to steer them. In the final weeks the team ran 14 Luna agents and 2 Opus 5.5 agents, and humans no longer needed to talk to the agents at all.

The other lasting fix was low-tech. Agents drifted, skipped ahead and closed issues before the work was done. The team wrote a document setting out the goal and the rules, and an hourly cron job told every agent to reread it. The author's lesson: "Instructions decay over time."

AI does the routine work. You do the thinking. In this project the thinking took a precise form: a definition of done that a machine could check and could not rewrite.

Your Next Move

  • Write the acceptance test before you delegate. Pick one recurring task you hand to AI this month. Write down what a correct output looks like, in terms someone else could check without asking you. If you cannot, nobody is really reviewing the AI's readable, confident output.
  • Keep the checker apart from the worker. Do not let the same model, or the same person, both produce the work and set the standard it is judged by. This team's agents kept trying to edit their own exam. Put the standard somewhere the producer cannot touch it.
  • Schedule the re-brief. Agent workflows that run for a long time drift. Keep a one-page instruction document and re-send it on a timer, as this team did every hour.

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About the author

Jo

Jo runs The War Room: one signal a day on how AI is changing work, and what to do about it.

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